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L Introduction
The extent to which securities professionals with significant disciplinary
histories or multiple investor complaints manage to remain in the securities
industry has attracted considerable attention in recent years. Members of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and officials of the various
securities self-regulatory organizations (SROs) have expressed concern over
the ability of some problem representatives to move from employment with
* Assistant General Counsel, National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
(NASD); Member, District of Columbia Bar; J.D., Georgetown University; B.A., College
of New Rochelle. The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect those of the Board of Governors or officers of the NASD.
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one broker-dealer to another and have explored ways of protecting investors
from such individuals. 1
Oddly enough, for over a decade a reporting form has existed that was
designed to offer regulators and potential employers a means of identifying
problem representatives. The form, known as the Uniform Termination
Notice for Securities Industry Registration (Form U-5) must be filed when-
ever an individual's employment with a broker-dealer is terminated.2 The
form requires the broker-dealer to report the reasons for the termination and
whether the terminated individual had been accused of or found to have
engaged in investment-related misconduct. The information reported on the
Form U-5 is shared among national and state regulatory bodies and is made
available to broker-dealers who consider employing the individual in the
future. In theory, the wide availability of Form U-5 information should
substantially limit the ability of problem representatives to remain in the
securities industry
In practice, however, the Form U-5 has had limited efficacy as an early
warning device. One of the most frequently cited explanations for this is
broker-dealers' concerns about defamation liability if they report adverse
information on the Form U-5 I In fact, some broker-dealers maintain -
1. See generally Phyllis Diamond, Special Report: "Rogue Broker" Problem Raises
Troubling Issues for Firms, Regulators, 26 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at 1207
(Sept. 2, 1994) [hereinafter Rogue Broker Report]; Commissioner J. Carter Beese, Jr.,
Remarks Before the Securities Industry Association 1993 Annual Convention 6-8 (Dec. 2,
1993) (copy on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); SEC Will Probe Smaller-Sized
Finns, Levitt Tells House Rogue Broker Heanng, 26 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at
1231 (Sept. 16, 1994); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES MARKETS: ACTIONS
NEEDED TO BETTER PROTECT INVESTORS AGAINST UNSCRUPULOUS BROKERS, GAOIGGD-94-
208 (Sept. 14, 1994).
Between 1992 and 1993, the SEC staff conducted a review of the personnel retention
and supervisory practices of the nine broker-dealers that carry approximately 49% of all
public customer accounts in the United States. The review focused on 268 individuals who
had been employed by one or more of these broker-dealers and who had been the subjects of
sales-practice-related customer complaints or enforcement actions by securities regulators.
The report concluded that, although there did not appear to be a pattern of movement by the
268 individuals among the nine firms studied, a significant number of the individuals were
able to change employment despite multiple customer complaints. See SEC DIVISIONS OF
MARKET REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT, THE LARGE FIRM REPORT: A REVIEW OF HIRING,
RETENTION AND SUPERVISORY PRACTICES 5 (May 1994) [hereinafter LARGE FIRM REPORT].
2. The term "termination" is used in a neutral sense both in the Form U-5 and m this
Article. Accordingly, the term refers to any termination of a registered individual's employ-
ment for any reason.
3. See LARGE FIRM REPORT, supra note 1, at 10; Rogue Broker Report, supra note
1, at 1207-08, 1209. See also Edward Felsenthal, Filings About Brokers' Departures from
1300
FORM U-5 DEFAMATION
given the substantial defamation exposure that they may face if they accur-
ately complete the Form U-5 - that it is wiser for them simply to give
departing employees "clean" Forms U-5, whether warranted or not.
When this occurs, regulators do not receive accurate information about
the reasons for terminations, prospective employers are not alerted to poten-
tial problems, and investors continue to be exposed to problem representa-
tives. Further, such nondisclosure can subject broker-dealers to civil actions
by subsequent investors who are injured by a problem representative or can
result in SRO disciplinary actions against the broker-dealer. Thus, the prop-
er handling of Form U-5 reporting presents a dilemma to broker-dealers:
Those that fail to report accurately and completely the reasons for an individ-
ual's termination may face negligence or disciplinary actions, while those
that respond accurately and completely to the Form U-5's questions may face
defamation suits.
The concerns over potential defamation exposure are so strong that
many broker-dealers maintain that candid Form U-5 reporting will not occur
until such reporting is protected by either an absolute or qualified privilege
against defamation liability ' Privilege supporters argue that the policies
underlying existing common-law defamation privileges support a Form U-5
privilege, or that such a privilege should be created by statute, or by SEC or
SRO rules.
This Article begins by briefly reviewing the background and uses of the
Form U-5 before addressing the limited precedents in the area of Form U-5
defamation. Much of the concern over Form U-5 defamation awards has
stemmed from an extremely small number of instances in which substantial
damages were awarded in cases that involved relatively innocuous Form U-5
information. These cases, which have received substantial publicity, appear
to form the basis for the perception that large Form U-5 defamation awards
are routine in nonmeritorious cases.
The attention such cases attract is disproportionate to either the volume
of defamation claims filed or to the number of defamation awards entered
against broker-dealers to date. As discussed in detail below, the available
information indicates that arbitration claims alleging Form U-5 defamation
are not routine. Since 1989, arbitrators have issued awards in approximately
fifty-five such cases. These awards represent an extremely small percentage
Finns SparkLibel Suits, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 1994, at B10.
4. See C. Evan Stewart, Disclosure of Bad Actors to Regulators: Matching Goals and
Realities, SECURITIES NEws, Fall 1994, at 10, 11 (advocating statutory enactment granting
absolute privilege); Rogue Broker Report, supra note 1, at 1207-08, 1209 (noting support for
recognition of qualified privilege for Form U-5 information).
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of the total number of arbitration cases handled by SROs. Moreover,
although arbitration panels have on occasion directed broker-dealers to pay
substantial damages for Form U-5 defamation, large awards are not the
norm. Indeed, it is far more common for arbitrators to disrmss Form U-5
defamation claims or to direct that the form be amended without awarding
any damages.
The five cases that have reached the courts to date follow a similar
trend. Indeed, two of these cases have held that broker-dealers enjoy
absolute immunity from liability for defamatory statements made m Forms
U-5 Under these decisions, registered representatives are precluded from
recovery for defamatory statements made on Forms U-5, even if the
representative can demonstrate that the reporting broker knew that the
information was false or otherwise acted maliciously
Thus, as is the case m another controversial area - the debate over lim-
iting punitive damages in civil litigation - isolated and atypical cases shape
the perception that a drastic overhaul is needed. Overlooked is that a
number of the Form U-5 defamation disputes have involved information
whose falsity was known to the reporting broker-dealers, rather than mad-
vertent errors. Indeed, it is widely acknowledged that false Form U-5
reporting has sometimes been used to retaliate against departing employees'
or threatened to gain concessions from such employees.6
Given such abuses, immunizing broker-dealers from all liability for
defamatory Form U-5 statements would afford insufficient protection to the
reputational interests of individuals employed m the securities industry Any
response to Form U-5 defamation concerns must balance these interests,
regulators' need for accurate and complete information about the movements
of problem representatives, and broker-dealers' desire for protection against
civil liability for good-faith errors in Form U-5 reporting. In order to
achieve such a balance, Form U-5 statements should enjoy only qualified
immunity from defamation liability
5. See, e.g., Hugh H. Makens & Norbert F Kugele, Forms U-41U-5 Disclosure:
Compiance and Related Problems (Part 2), NSCP CURRENTS, Sept./Oct. 1992, at 2, 3; Tad
Leahy, Marked for Life, REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVE, Aug. 1990, at 24, 25.
6. For example, earlier this year, an arbitration panel awarded an individual $625,000
m compensatory damages and $1.25 million in punitive damages after finding that the content
of the individual's Form U-5 was "improperly used" in negotiations over a severance package
"in order to manipulate a settlement." Ulrich v Whitaker, NASD Arbitration No. 93-281,
at 4 (Jan. 11, 1995). See also Michael Siconofli, Ex-Brokers Claim Prudential Changes Work
Records, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 1995, at C1 (discussing allegations that broker-dealer has
filed derogatory amendments to Forms U-5 to retaliate against former employees who assisted
customers in claims against broker-dealer).
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II. The Form U-5 and Its Use
The Form U-5 is the standard form used in the securities industry to
report the termination of a registered representative's association with a
broker-dealer. The form was developed jointly by the staffs of the SEC, the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD), the North Amen-
can Securities Administrators Association (NASAA), and the various
securities exchanges. NASD rules require that member firms file the form
within thirty days of an individual's termination and update the form within
thirty days of learning any information that renders the original filing
inaccurate.7 The NASD also requires member firms concurrently to provide
terminated individuals with a copy of their Form U-5 and any amendments
thereto.'
The portions of the form raising defamation concerns relate to the
reasons for an individual's termination9 and to indications of possible mis-
conduct by the individual. Specifically, Question 13 of the form" asks
whether, during employment, the terminated individual was:
[13(A)] involved in any disciplinary action by a foreign or domestic
body or self regulatory organization with jurisdiction over investment-
related business;"
[(B)] the subject of an investment-related, consumer-initiated com-
plaint that: (1) alleged compensatory damages of $10,000 or more,
fraud, or the wrongful taking of property; [or] (2) was settled or
decided against the individual for $5,000 or more, found fraud, or the
wrongful taking of property;
7 NASD By-Laws, art. IV, § 3, NASD Manual (CCH) 1153, at 1050 (1995).
8. Id.
9. The form requires that terminations be classified in one of five categories: "volun-
tary," "deceased," "permitted to resign," "discharged," or "other." The last three classifica-
tions require an explanation.
10. As discussed in greater detail below, infra note 29, the Form U-5 is m the process
of revision. When the revised form goes into use in 1996, the relevant questions will be
renumbered as 13 through 18.
11. FORM U-5: UNIFORM TERMINATION NOTICE FOR SECURITIES INDUSTRY REGIsTRA-
TiON 3 (Nov 1991). The Form U-5 defines "disciplinary action" as the "denial, revocation,
or suspension of a registration, or a censure, fine, cease-and-desist order, order of prohibi-
tion, temporary restraining order, injunction, bar, or expulsion." Id. at 2. The term
"investment-related" is defined as "pertaining to securities, commodities, banking, insurance,
or real estate (including, but not limited to, acting as or being associated with a broker-dealer,
investment company, investment adviser, futures sponsor, bank, or savings and loan
association)." Id.
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[(C)] convicted of, or pleaded guilty to or nolo contendere in a
domestic or foreign court to: (1) a felony or misdemeanor involving
investments or an investment-related business, fraud, false statements
or omissions, wrongful taking of property, bribery, forgery, counter-
feiting, extortion, or gambling; or (2) any other felony 12
In addition, Questions 14 and 15 of the form require broker-dealers to report
whether, at the time of termination or submission of the Form U-5, the
terminated individual was:
[14] involved in an investigation or proceeding 3 by a domestic or
foreign governmental body or self regulatory organization with
jurisdiction over investment-related businesses; [or]
[15] under internal review for fraud or wrongful taking of property,
or violating investment-related statutes, regulations, rules or industry
standards of conduct.4
An affirmative answer to any of the foregoing questions requires the broker-
dealer to provide additional detailed information regarding each event,
occurrence, proceeding, or investigation that necessitated the affirmative
response.
The form is filed with the NASD, which routinely initiates an investiga-
tion whenever a Form U-5 reports that an individual was terminated for
cause or contains an affirmative response to Questions 13 through 15.15 The
Form U-5 is often the first indication that the NASD receives regarding
possible nsconduct by members of the securities industry, and mvestiga-
tions of misconduct reported on the Form U-5 frequently lead to the mitia-
tion of disciplinary action by the NASD "6
The Form U-5 information is also entered into the Central Registration
Depository (CRD), a computerized database that the NASD operates in con-
12. Id. at 3.
13. The term "proceeding" as used m the Form U-5 includes formal administrative and
civil actions initiated by SROs and governmental agencies and formal criminal charges. See
NASD NOTICE TO MEMBERS 91-81 (NASD, Inc. Washington, D.Q, Dec. 1991, at 451.
14. FORM U-5, supra note 11, at 3.
15. See generally NASD NOTICE TO MEMBERS 90-61 (NASD, Inc. Washington, D.C.),
Oct. 1990, at 345-46.
16. In recognition of this fact, the NASD's two-year period to bring disciplinary action
runs from the NASD's receipt of the Form U-5 or the last amendment thereto. See NASD
By-Laws, art. HI, § 6, NASD Manual (CCH) 1136, at 1048 (1995); NASD By-Laws, art.
IV, § 4, NASD Manual (CCH) 1154, at 1051 (1995); NASD NOTICE TO MEMBERS 92-19
(NASD, Inc. Washington, D.C.), Apr. 1992, at 108.
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junction with the NASAA.17 The CRD maintains registration information
concerning NASD member firms and their registered personnel for access
by state regulators, certain SROs, and the SEC."8 The CRD also contains
information about regulatory and enforcement actions that these regulatory
authorities have taken against broker-dealers and their registered personnel.19
The NASD views CRD information as a way to advise regulators of
potential wrongdoing and to facilitate transfers of registered personnel from
one broker-dealer to another. Although the NASD makes some CRD m-
formation publicly available,' neither Forms U-5 nor the full range of CRD
information is publicly available through the NASD. Many states, however,
treat the information as public, and release the full contents of an individ-
ual's CRD file on request. 21 As a consequence, in addition to being widely
circulated among regulators, the contents of a Form U-5 sometimes can be
obtained by members of the public, including a representative's current or
potential customers. Adverse information reported on the form therefore can
have a substantial effect on an individual's business reputation and liveli-
hood.
However, even when Form U-5 information does not reach the general
public, NASD rules require that Forms U-5 be provided to a representative's
prospective broker-dealer employers and considered in the hiring process.22
17 See Approval of Proposed Rule Change Relating to Release of Certain Information
Regarding Disciplinary History, Exchange Act Release No. 30,629, 1992 WL 87786 (Apr.
23, 1992) [hereinafter Rule Change Relating to Release of Information]. The CRD was orig-
inally designed as a registration system to facilitate the licensing process with the states and
the SROs. The system contains detailed information about more than 450,000 individuals.
See LARGE FIRM REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
18. See Rule Change Relating to Release of Information, supra note 17, at *11 n.3.
19. Id.
20. Since 1988, the NASD has operated a public disclosure program whereby members
of the public can obtain information regarding broker-dealers and their registered personnel.
At present, members of the public can call a toll-free telephone number to obtain information
on the following matters: pending and final disciplinary or enforcement actions by state and
federal securities agencies and SROs; pending and final disciplinary actions by foreign gov-
ernments and regulatory authorities; criminal indictments, informations, and convictions; civil
judgments; and securities- or commodities-related arbitration awards m cases that were miti-
ated by public customers. See generally LARGE FIRM REPORT, supra note 1, app. A at 7-8.
21. See Jane Bryant Quinn, Brokers' Histories Should Stay Accessible, WAsH. POST,
Oct. 8, 1995, at H2 (discussing public access to CRD information).
22. NASD rules require member firms to investigate the "good character, business
repute, qualifications, and experience" of new hires. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III,
§ 27(e), NASD Manual (CCH) 2177, at 2118 (1995). As part of this obligation to
investigate qualifications, NASD member firms are required to obtain a copy of an individ-
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Thus, the inclusion of negative information on the form can substantially
affect an individual's prospects for continued employment in the securities
industry Even when adverse Form U-5 information does not prevent an
individual from gaming further employment m the securities industry, such
uiformation will substantially slow the individual's registration with a
subsequent broker-dealer employer.'
While few would dispute the appropriateness of requiring prospective
broker-dealers to consider past investment-related misconduct in determining
whether to hire an individual, the inclusion on a Form U-5 of false accusa-
tions of misconduct can have particularly unfair consequences to the affected
individual.' The potential for unfairness is heightened by the limited oppor-
ual's most recent Form U-5, plus all amendments thereto, within 60 days of filing a Form
U-4 to register the individual. Id. at 2118. The Form U-5 may be obtained either from the
individual or through the Finn Access Query System (FAQS), a service that the NASD makes
available to NASD member firms. Id. If a prospective employer requests a copy of the Form
U-5 directly from the individual seeking employment, the individual must provide the form
within two days. Id. § 27(f), at 2118.
23. Affirmative answers on Forms U-5 preclude an individual from using the temporary
agent transfer program (TAT) electronically to transfer registrations in the various states to
a new broker-dealer. The individual who is unable to use TAT must undergo a thorough
review in various states before transfer is permitted, and that person may be required to pro-
vide detailed information regarding misconduct suggested on the Form U-5 prepared by the
previous employer. This process can take up to several months. See generally Leahy, supra
note 5, at 24, 25.
The current TAT program will soon be replaced by a relicensing program as part of the
CRD redesign described in note 29 infra. The new program will expedite registration trans-
fers for most individuals, including some with affirmative answers to questions 13 through
15 on the Form U-5 or to question 22 on the Uniform Application for Securities Industry
Registration or Transfer (Form U-4). Question 22 on the Form U-4 requires individuals who
are seeking to register with a broker-dealer to report information similar to that reported by
former employers on the Form U-5.
24. In 1989, the NASD began requiring that prospective employers receive past Forms
U-5, recognizing that the circumstances surrounding a termination may be relevant in hiring
decisions and should be readily available to NASD members for that purpose. See NASD
NoTIcE TO MEMBERS 89-23 (NASD, Inc. Washington, D.C.), Mar. 1989, at 147 At the
same time, the NASD recognized that providing broader access to the Form U-5 required that
terminated persons be given the Form U-5 so that they could verify the accuracy and com-
pleteness of the contents of the form and advise prospective employers of any disagreement
as to the accuracy of the form. NASD NOTICE TO MEMBERS 89-57 (NASD, Inc. Washington,
D.C.), Aug. 1989, at 313. Accordingly, the requirements that copies of the Form U-5 be
provided both to terminated individuals and to prospective employers were added simultan-
eously. See id. Other SROs adopted comparable requirements one year later. See generally
Rule Change Relating to Exchange Rule 345 Regarding Employees - Registration, Approval,
and Records, Exchange Act Release No. 28,367, 1990 WL 321546 (Aug. 23, 1990)
(approving New York Stock Exchange's requirements).
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tunities for individuals to respond to, or require the correction of, erroneous
Form U-5 information.' The Form U-5 is completed by the former em-
ployer with no input by the terminated employee.' Short of initiating an
arbitration proceeding,27 a terminated employee who disputes the accuracy
of Form U-5 information has no means of compelling his former employer
to correct inaccurate Form U-5 information,' although there are less formal
means by which some terminated representatives can have a rebuttal included
in the CRD. 9
25. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
26. Individuals authorize former employers to provide Form U-5 information. The
Form U-4 - which individuals are required to complete when they enter or change employ-
ment in the securities industry or when certain reportable events occur - authorizes former
employers to provide information regarding, among other things, the individual's credit-
worthiness, character, ability, business activities, educational background, general reputation,
employment history, and reasons for termination. The Form U-4 also contains a provision
whereby the individual releases former employers from liability for furmshing such informa-
tion on the Form U-5. The Form U-4 waiver language does not appear to have been intended
to immunize prospectively defamatory Form U-5 statements made in bad faith. See infra note
58 and accompanying text.
27 SRO rules generally require that employment-related disputes between broker-
dealers and their registered representatives be arbitrated, and registered representatives agree
to be bound by such rules when they execute a Form U-4. Although claims of Form U-5
defamation arise after the termination of employment, they are arbitrable due to the nexus
between the employment relationship and the alleged post-employment defamation. See, e.g.,
Fleck v E.F Hutton Group, Inc., 891 F.2d 1047, 1050-53 (2d Cir. 1989).
28. See Leahy, supra note 5, at 25.
29. Former employees who remain in the securities industry may submit a written
response when they execute a Form U-4 in connection with their application to associate with
a new broker-dealer. Such a response is included in the CRD. Nevertheless, the disputed
information from the Form U-5 remains in the CRD and continues to be available to all who
have access to CRD information. However, representatives who are unable to find employ-
ment within the securities industry (whether or not this inability stems from the inaccurate
Form U-5) or individuals who elect to leave the industry do not have occasion to execute a
new Form U-4. Consequently, such individuals have no means of including in the CRD their
version of disputed events.
The CRD system is currently undergoing a major redesign. Implementation of the
revised system is scheduled to begin m 1996. As part of the CRD redesign, Forms U-4 and
U-5 have been substantially revised, and the forms will be filed electronically The most
significant changes relate to the disclosure questions on Forms U-4 and U-5 (i.e., Question
22 on the Form U-4 and Questions 13 through 15 on the Form U-5), which will be made
more parallel and will require more detailed reporting. The planned changes also will
provide individuals with greater opportunities to respond to negative information reported
about them on a Form U-5. Even with the planned changes, however, initiating an arbitration
proceeding will remain the sole means by which an individual can compel a former employer
to correct a Form U-5 that contains false information.
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The Form U-5's potential as a source of defamation claims is obvious.
The form requires the reporting of information that is directly relevant to an
individual's business reputation and conduct, including suspicions of nus-
conduct that may ultimately prove unfounded. Individuals who dispute the
accuracy of a Form U-5 have limited opportunity to require that the form be
corrected. Moreover, due to the time necessary to arbitrate a Form U-5
dispute, any such correction is unlikely to be compelled before the false
information has been republished. Information reported on the form is
widely available, not only to regulators, but also to individuals' prospective
employers. Indeed, broker-dealers that are NASD members are obligated
to consider the Form U-5 information in making hiring decisions. And,
even when the presence of negative information does not prevent an individ-
ual from gaming subsequent employment within the securities industry, the
processes of changing employers is substantially slowed when a Form U-5
contains negative information. Thus, it is hardly surprising that disputes
over the accuracy of Forms U-5 have increasingly led to litigation in recent
years. The following section reviews this trend and the relatively small
number of disputes that have moved from the various arbitration forums into
the courts.
III. Defamation Cases Involving Forms U-5
A. Arbitration Claims
Perhaps the most overlooked aspect of the current discussion of Form
U-5 defamation is the relative infrequency with which disputes over the
content of forms have actually ripened into litigation through the filing of
arbitration claims. Although it is clear that arbitration panels have from time
to time directed broker-dealers to pay substantial sums for Form U-5 defam-
ation, such awards are not the norm and have not been directed when the
facts reflected that broker-dealers either truthfully reported negative mforma-
tion or inadvertently reported inaccurate information. Rather, most large
awards appear to have been directed in cases in which the evidence sug-
gested deliberate reporting of inaccurate information or other forms of
abusive behavior in connection with Form U-5 reporting.' Overall, it is far
30. See, e.g., Ulrich v Whitaker, NASD Arbitration No. 93-281 (Jan. 11, 1995)
($1,875,000 award attributable in part to firm's false reporting of adverse information on
Form U-5 to gain concessions from former employee in negotiations over severance pack-
age); Benzer v Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., NYSE Arbitration No. 1992-2500 (Apr. 4,
1994) ($65,000 m actual damages and $65,000 in punitive damages awarded based on finding
that broker-dealer was "grossly negligent in its failure to verify the accuracy" of information
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more common for arbitrators either to dismiss Form U-5 defamation claims
or to direct that the form be amended without awarding any monetary dam-
ages. The available statistics do not suggest that such claims are routinely
raised or that large damage awards are the norm m such claims.
The overall number of securities-related arbitrations has increased
significantly m recent years. Case filings currently average approximately
6,600 per year. The American Arbitration Association handles approxi-
mately ten percent of the claims, and SROs handle the balance. The NASD
handles approximately eighty percent of the SRO cases.3 The "industry"
disputes that may include claims of Form U-5 defamation represent approxi-
mately two percent of the claims that are actually arbitrated by the NASD.'
A review of awards issued by all SROs in such cases since 1989, when
arbitration awards became publicly available, yielded only fifty-five litigated
cases that in some manner involved claims of Form U-5 defamation. Thus,
arbitration claims that related to Form U-5 defamation represent not only a
tiny percentage of the total umverse of SRO arbitration awards, but also a
small fraction of those issued in "industry" disputes.
Only seven of the fifty-five cases can be characterized as "pure"
defamation claims. In two of these "pure" defamation cases, the defamation
claims were sustained and the broker-dealers were directed to file amended
in Form U-5); Naparst v Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., NYSE Arbitration No. 1993-3433
(Mar. 28, 1994) ($175,000 m damages awarded because stated reason on Form U-5 for
termination was defamatory and without merit, and former employer was. required to file
amended Form U-5 stating that individual had been terminated because he was believed to
have accepted a position with a competing broker-dealer); Baravati v Rosenkantz Lyon &
Ross Inc. n/k/a Josephthal Lyon & Ross Inc., NASD Arbitration No. 91-419 (Jan. 12, 1993)
(punitive damages awarded because of "unconscionable language" contained m Form U-5 that
had caused "severe harm"); Watkins v Edward D. Jones & Co., NASD Arbitration No. 88-
1248 (June 14, 1989) ($248,163.80 in damages awarded and broker-dealer was directed to
file amended Form U-5 acknowledging that previously reported allegations of wrongdoing
and unsupervisability were unsupported, and firm would be required to pay additional
$500,000 if corrected Form U-5 was not filed within 30 days). See also Fahnestock & Co.
v Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1120 (1992)
(affirming award of $100,000 in actual damages for defamation and $100,000 in punitive
damages based on "ample" record evidence of broker-dealer's "flagrantly spiteful conduct,
demonstrating its intent simply to injure [former employee's] reputation").
31. See, e.g., Martin L. Budd, Securities Industry Arbitration - Recent Issues (Dec. 9,
1994), reprinted in BROKER-DEALER REGULATION: ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS
205, 207 (1995).
32. In 1993, 5,419 cases were filed with the NASD. Of these, 2,723 were resolved
without arbitration, and 1,604 went to arbitration. Of the cases that were arbitrated, only 275
involved disputes between members of the securities industry. The balance were brought by
customers against brokerage firms. Id.
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Forms U-5, but no monetary damages were awarded.33 In the remaining five
cases, substantial damages were awarded, although correction of the defama-
tory Form U-5 was not ordered m all cases.'
More typical than the "pure" defamation claims are cases m which
defamation claims were raised m connection with other charges, such as
wrongful termination. In eleven of these "mixed" cases, the defamation
claims were dismissed, although m two cases the dismissal was coupled with
a requirement that an amended Form U-5 be filed.35 Monetary awards m the
remaining "mixed" cases follow no consistent pattern. The awards m such
cases typically direct the payment of damages without any identification of
the portions of the award that are attributable to specific claims.36 There-
33. See Nobil v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., NYSE Arbitration No. 1992-2549 (Jan.
28, 1994); Smukler v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., NYSE Arbitration No. 1992-2240 (July
14, 1993).
34. See Ulrich v Whitaker, NASD Arbitration No. 93-281 (Jan. 11, 1995) ($625,000
in actual damages and $1,250,000 in punitive damages; no correction ordered); Benzer v
Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., NYSE Arbitration No. 1992-2500 (Apr. 4, 1994) ($65,000 in
compensatory damages and $65,000 in punitive damages; finding no defamation; no correc-
tion ordered); Zackoffv Masterson Moreland Sauer Whisman, Inc., NASD Arbitration No.
92-913 (Nov 9, 1993) ($30,000 in actual damages, costs of $56,000, and attorney fees of
$50,000; correction ordered); Polk v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., NASD
No. 91-1450 (Mar. 27, 1992) ($200,000 in actual damages, apparently for Form U-5
defamation; correction ordered); Watkms v Edward D. Jones & Co., NASD Arbitration No.
88-1248 (June 14, 1989) ($248,163.80 in damages; correction ordered; firm directed to pay
additional $500,000 in damages if corrected Form U-5 was not fied within 30 days).
35. See Pepe v Emanuel & Co., NASD Arbitration No. 93-0516 (May 10, 1995)
(defamation claim dismissed as untimely); Joyce v Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., NASD
Arbitration No. 93-5039 (Mar. 8, 1995) (all claims dismissed); Sheeley v G.N.A. Sec. Co.,
NASD Arbitration No. 93-4971 (Feb. 28, 1995) (all claims dismissed, but correction
ordered); Lowry v Expansion Capital See., NASD Arbitration No. 93-4256 (Dec. 29, 1994)
(Form U-5 defamation claim dismissed); Dranove v Kidder, Peabody & Co., NASD
Arbitration No. 93-1546 (July 29, 1994) (all claims dismissed); Clem v Prudential Sec.,
Inc., NASD Arbitration No. 92-4083 (Feb. 18, 1994) (defamation claim dismissed, but
correction ordered); Denes v PameWebber, Inc., NASD Arbitration No. 92-3563 (Jan. 19,
1994) (defamation claim dismissed); Albanese v Gruntal & Co., NYSE Arbitration No.
1993-3116 (Oct. 13, 1993) (all claims dismissed); Scippio v TMI Equities, Inc., NASD
Arbitration No. 92-2766 (July 15, 1993) (same); DeWindt v Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,
NYSE Arbitration (July 22, 1991) (same); McKie v American Interstate Fin. Corp., NASD
Arbitration No. 91-2515 (Apr. 22, 1992) (defamation claim dismissed).
36. See Schupbach v Prudential Sec., Inc., NASD Arbitration No. 93-1754 (June 23,
1995) ($299 awarded on claims that included Form U-5 defamation); Kashkm v Robert Todd
Fin. Corp., NASD Arbitration No. 93-4778 (June 13, 1995) ($8,556.28 in damages;
correction ordered); Honn v R.J. Steichen and Co., NASD Arbitration No. 93-2443 (Sept.
2, 1994) ($7,312.50 awarded as compensatory damages, penalties, and attorneys fees; correc-
tion ordered); Naparst v Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., NYSE Arbitration No. 1993-3433
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fore, m most "mixed" cases it is difficult to determine how much of an
award of monetary damages, if any, can be attributed to Form U-5 defama-
tion. In some "mixed" cases, the claim of Form U-5 defamation was raised
as a counterclaim after an individual's former employer initiated an arbitra-
tion proceeding against the individual. As with the other "mixed" cases,
there is no pattern to the disposition of defamation claims raised as counter-
claims. 37  Finally, it appears that in three cases arbitrators sua sponte
(Mar. 28, 1994) ($175,000 in compensatory damages; correction ordered); Lockwood v
Donald & Co. Sec., NASD Arbitration No. 92-2213 (Mar. 9, 1994) ($25,000 m damages for
Form U-5 defamation; correction ordered); Richard v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., NASD Arbitration No. 93-552 (Feb. 28, 1994) ($8,832.58 in damages;
correction ordered); Glennon v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., NASD Arbitration No. 91-2594
(Oct. 7, 1993) ($728,250 m compensatory damages and $750,000 m punitive damages for
Form U-5 defamation; $213,878 m attorney fees; correction ordered); Baravati v Rosen-
krantz Lyon & Ross, Inc. n/k/a Josephthal Lyon & Ross Inc., NASD Arbitration No. 91-419
(Jan. 12, 1993) ($60,000 in actual damages; $120,000 m punitive damages; correction
ordered); Bulfin v Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., NYSE Arbitration No. 1990-1372 (May 12,
1992) ($61,950 m damages; correction ordered); Berkeley v PaineWebber, Inc., NASD
Arbitration No. 90-2908 (Feb. 27, 1993) ($1 million in actual damages; correction ordered);
Wiener v Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 1991 WL 330320 (NYSE Arbitration, Oct. 18,
1991) ($135,000 m damages for wrongful termination; defamation claim dismissed); Wong
v Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., NYSE Arbitration No. 1991-284 (Aug. 29, 1991)
($45,000 in damages; correction ordered); Leighton v Morgan Keegan & Co., NYSE
Arbitration (Apr. 9, 1991) (correction ordered); Urban v Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., NASD
Arbitration No. 89-242 (Mar. 4, 1991) ($10,000 in damages); Wilson v Prudential-Bache
Sec., Inc., NASD Arbitration No. 89-2328 (Nov 12, 1990) (correction ordered); Emrick v
Deutsch Bank Capital Corp., NYSE Arbitration (Nov 11, 1990) ($65,416 in damages; no
correction ordered); Keitel v PameWebber, Inc., NASD Arbitration No. 89-2393 (Oct. 4,
1990) ($22,349 m damages; correction ordered); Prescott, Ball & Turben, Inc. v Kanuth,
NASD Arbitration No. 88-1919 (May 2, 1990) (total damage award of $38,232,979, in-
cluding $1 million for defamation and punitive damages of $1 million; correction ordered);
Russo v. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc., NASD Arbitration No. 87-847 (Dec. 8, 1989)
($3,500 m damages; correction ordered; firm directed to pay additional $75,000 if corrected
Form U-5 not filed within 30 days); Moran v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
NYSE Arbitration (Oct. 26, 1989) ($30,500 m damages; correction ordered; broker-dealer
directed to send copy of corrected Form U-5 to state employment commission). But see
Deutsch v. Raymond James & Assocs., NASD Arbitration No. 91-1238 (Feb. 28, 1992) (at-
tributing amounts to specific claims: $1.00 m compensatory damages and $50,000 m punitive
damages for Form U-5 defamation claim; $22,013 awarded for other claims; correction of
Form U-5 required).
37 See Glenfed Brokerage Servs. v PameWebber, Inc., NASD Arbitration No. 94-
5065 (June 13, 1995) (defamation counterclaim dismissed; correction ordered); PameWebber,
Inc. v Miceli, NASD Arbitration No. 94-1058 (Mar. 29, 1995) ($47,706.76 awarded on
defamation and other counterclaims; no correction ordered); PaineWebber, Inc. v Batu,
NASD Arbitration No. 92-4233 (Dec. 12, 1994) ($10,000 awarded for defamation); Johnston
Lemon & Co. v. Smith, NASD Arbitration No. 92-218 (July 8, 1994) (two former employees
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directed that Forms U-5 be corrected, although the arbitration claimants did
not raise a defamation claim or request correction.38
Broker-dealers' expressions of extreme concern over defamation expos-
ure from supplying adverse information on the Form U-5 thus appear dis-
proportionate to the actual extent of such.exposure, particularly when truth
constitutes a complete defense to defamation claims. Perhaps, as is the case
in another area of substantial concern to broker-dealers - the award of punt-
tive damages in arbitration - the perception that a substantial threat exists,
rather than the reality of such a threat, forms the basis for arguments that a
drastic overhaul of existing law is needed.39
B. Judicial Decisions
To date, only five courts have ruled on defamation claims that arose in
the context of U-5 mformation. 40 Four are federal court decisions (two from
awarded $175,000 and $100,000, respectively, for broker-dealer's "improper conduct"; broker-
dealer directed to file corrected Forms U-5); PaineWebber, Inc. v Flickinger, NASD
Arbitration No. 92-4145 (Mar. 21, 1994) (defamation counterclaim dismissed; correction
ordered); PaineWebber, Inc. v Gnmal, NASD Arbitration No. 91-1713 (Mar. 16, 1992) (cor-
rection ordered); Smith Barney, Hams Upham & Co. v Sullivan, 1991 WL 330337 (NYSE
Arbitration, Oct. 10, 1991) (defamation counterclaim dismissed); PaineWebber, Inc. v Bahary,
NASD Arbitration No. 90-2913 (Sept. 30, 1991) (correction ordered); Prudential-Bache Sec.,
Inc. v. Berman, NYSE Arbitration (May 18, 1991) (counterclaims disrmssed); Rauscher Pierce
Refsnes, Inc. v Stallones, NASD Arbitration No. 87-2231 (Dec. 12, 1990) (correction
required; damages for claim and counterclaim offset); Bear Stearns & Co. v Browne, 1990 WL
306705 (NYSE Arbitration, June 23, 1990) ($1.00 awarded on both claim and counterclaim);
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Jablonski, 1990 WL 306333 (NYSE Arbitration, Mar. 2,
1990) (correction required although defamation claim dismissed); Fahnestock & Co. v.
Waltman, 1990 WL 306636 (NYSE Arbitration, Jan. 19, 1990) ($100,000 awarded on
defamation counterclaim; $56,000 apparently awarded on wrongful termination counterclaim;
$100,000 in punitive damages).
38. See Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Gregoire, NYSE Arbitration (Aug. 1, 1991);
Moss v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., NYSE Arbitration (Feb. 28, 1991); Rosenberg v Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., NYSE Arbitration (Dec. 14, 1990).
39. See generally Dwight Golann, Consumer Litigation in the Age of Combat Banlang,
45 Bus. LAW 1761, 1771 & nn. 57-59 (1990) (stating that contrary to perception, punitive
damage verdicts are not routinely awarded and, when awarded, are usually not astronomical);
Stephen Damels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 Minn. L. Rev
1 (1990) (same); Joan Biskupic, The Case of the $4 Million BMW Award to Owner of Repainted
Car IsAt Heart of Punitive Damages Debate, WASH. POST, May 29, 1995, at A4 (large punitive
damage awards that receive wide publicity, such as those awarded for undisclosed repainting
of automobile or burns caused by scalding coffee served at drive-through restaurant, have
disproportionate effect on public perceptions although awarded in small percentage of cases and,
when challenged, are often reduced).
40. This figure excludes cases in which Form U-5 defamation issues were raised in some
manner, but the courts did not rule on privilege issues. This category mcudes Twiss v. Kury,
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courts of appeals, and two from district courts) and one is a decision from
the intermediate state court in New York. Three of the five cases arose in
the context of actions to confirm or set aside arbitration awards 4 1 and con-
sequently, the role of the reviewing courts was extremely circumscribed.4'
In each of these cases, the courts concluded that broker-dealers enjoy only
a qualified privilege for defamatory information reported on Forms U-5. In
25 F.3d 1551 (1lth Cir. 1994) (holding that under Florida law, investors may bring negligence
action against broker-dealer ihat failed to report misconduct on terminated individual's Form
U-5); Fleck v. E.F Hutton Group, Inc., 891 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that Form U-5
defamation claims are arbitrable); Haburjak v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 759 F Supp. 293
(W.D.N.C. 1991) (granting broker-dealer's motion for summary judgment on claim that firm
failed to timely file Form U-5 for terminated employee); Safford v. PaineWebber, Inc., 730 F
Supp. 15 (E.D. La. 1990) (dismissing claims of Form U-5 defamation as untimely); Merrill
Lynch Futures, Inc. v. Miller, 686 F Supp. 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting firm's proffered
defense, in defamation action alleging oral defamation by terminating employer to subsequent
employer, that Form U-5 attributed individual's discharge to his failure to disclose trading
improprieties); Feinberg v. Oppenheimer & Co., 658 F Supp. 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding
that defamation claims based on Form U-5 statements are arbitrable).
41. As previously noted, supra note 27, SRO rules effectively require arbitration of dis-
putes over Form U-5 reporting.
42. The standard of review that courts must apply to motions to vacate arbitration awards
is extremely deferential. As a general matter, arbitration awards may not be set aside unless
they evidence manifest disregard of the law. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953),
overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Amencan Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477, 484-85 (1989). To constitute "manifest disregard of the law," an error must have
been "obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person
qualified to serve as an arbitrator." Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker,
808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986). Further, the term "disregard"
implies that the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal
principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it. The governing law
alleged to have been ignored by the arbitrators must be well defined, explicit, and
clearly applicable. [Courts]-are not at liberty to set aside an arbitration panel's
award because of an arguable difference regarding the meaning or applicability of
laws urged upon [them].
Id. at 933-34 (citations omitted).
Moreover, arbitrators are not required to explain their awards. United Steelworkers v.
Enterpnse Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960). Thus, an arbitration panel's failure
to explain how it determined damage awards for Form U-5 defamation does not constitute
manifest disregard of the law. See id. at 597-98 (enforcing arbitrator's ambiguous opinion that
permitted inference that arbitrator may have exceeded authority or that arbitrator premised
award on construction of agreement).
Given the very deferential standard that courts must apply in reviewing arbitration awards
and the absence of any requirement that arbitrators explain their reasoning for defamation
rulings, most of the Form U-5 defamation decisions discussed in the text are not necessarily
indicative of what the same courts would do if confronted with the same issues in the first
instance.
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two of the five cases, however, courts reached the opposite conclusion, and
ruled that broker-dealers are absolutely protected when they report defama-
tory information on Forms U-5. Interestingly, both of these cases were
litigated in court m the first instance, instead of reaching court m the more
common context of a motion to confirm or set aside an arbitration award.
1. The Qualified Pnvilege Cases:
Baravati v Josephthal, Lyon & Ross; Fahnestock & Co. v Waltman;
and Glennon v Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
The following subsection reviews the three decisions that have rejected
arguments that Form U-5 information should enjoy complete protection from
-defamation liability Although the decisions reached the common conclusion
that only a qualified privilege protects Form U-5 information, they applied
somewhat differing analyses. One court analogized Form U-5 information
to employee references, which have enjoyed a qualified privilege under the
common law The other two courts drew an analogy between Form U-5
information and statements made pursuant to a legal duty, which also have
enjoyed qualified protection under the common law
a. Employee References
The most recent federal appellate decision in the area is Baravati v
Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc.4' As is typical in Form U-5 defamation
cases, Baravati arose from a less-than-amicable termination of an individ-
ual's employment. Ahmad Baravati obtained from his clients indications of
interest in an initial public offering that some of the clients subsequently
withdrew " A disagreement developed between Baravati and his supervisors
over the handling of these cancellations, and eventually Baravati called the
local office of the SEC to relay his concerns over the matter.45 This call
prompted an SEC inquiry, which m turn appears to have precipitated
Baravati's involuntary termination.' After Josephthal fired Baravati, the
firm filed a Form U-5 which indicated that, at the time of his termination,
43. 28 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 1994).
44. Baravati v Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 834 F Supp. 1023, 1025 (N.D. Ill.
1993), aft'd, 28 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 1994).
45. 834 F Supp. at 1025-26.
46. Firm records reflected that, approximately one week before Baravati's termination,
his immediate supervisor had requested that he be terminated for failing to follow company
policy However, it was not until later in the day on which the SEC interviewed the
supervisor that Baravati was terminated. Id. at 1026.
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Baravati was under internal review for "wrongful taking of firm property"
in the amount of $7,650.' 7
Baravati filed an arbitration claim in which he sought damages for,
among other things, retaliatory discharge and defamation." An NASD arbi-
tration panel directed that the firm and various of its officials pay Baravati
$60,000 in actual damages on his various claims, plus $120,000 in punitive
damages for what the panel characterized as the "unconscionable language"
contained m Baravati's Form U-5. The panel stated that this language had
caused Baravati "severe harm. "'I The panel also directed that the firm file
an amended Form U-5 that deleted the offending language °
When Baravati asked a federal court to confirm the award, Josephthal
resisted on the ground that statements m the Form U-5 were absolutely
privileged, based on an absolute privilege recognized under common law for
statements made in connection with quasi-judicial proceedings.51 The district
court rejected this argument and confirmed the award.'
The firm appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Significantly, the privilege issue
raised in Baravati was a narrow one: whether information reported on the
Form U-5 enjoyed an absolute privilege. All parties conceded that Form
U-5 information enjoyed the same qualified privilege that employee
references are traditionally accorded.5" As is the case with any qualified
privilege, the limited protection traditionally afforded to employee references
can be forfeited if abused.' Given the lack of any apparent dispute that
Josephthal knew the information reported on Baravati's Form U-5 was false,
the case turned on whether the information was protected by an absolute
privilege.
47 Id. In addition, the firm sent a letter to state labor officials which indicated that
Baravat had been terminated for cause and owed the firm approximately $4,900 for unauth-
ortzed trades. Id. The Form U-5 prompted the NASD to review the circumstances surround-
ing Baravati's termination. The investigation was concluded without initiation of a discip-




51. Id. at 1027-28.
52. Id. at 1028-29, 1038.
53. Baravati v Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir. 1994).
54. The Baravati court noted that, under Illinois law, the employee-reference privilege
can be lost if an employer knows or is reckless in failing to discover that it is defaming an
employee falsely. d.
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The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by noting that the NASD was
invested with quasi-judicial responsibilities under the federal securities laws
and that participants in the proceedings through which the NASD discharged
those responsibilities enjoyed an absolute privilege to the same extent as in
judicial proceedings.55 The court, however, noted that the submission of a
Form U-5 and its transmission to NASD member firms did not represent
stages in the NASD's quasi-judicial disciplinary process. Instead, the court
viewed the form as the means by which the NASD administered an "employ-
ment clearinghouse" through which NASD member firms obtained poten-
tially valuable information concerning the availability and suitability of
potential employees.56 The court reasoned that this information-sharing
service was remote from a judicial proceeding, notwithstanding that Form
U-5 information - like any item of information - could trigger an NASD
investigation or be introduced as evidence in a disciplinary proceeding.
Consequently, the court concluded that insulating broker-dealers from all
liability for the contents of Forms U-5 "would be tantamount to allowing a
member of the NASD to blackball a former employee from employment
throughout [a] large sector of the [securities] industry "'
Baravati is the only judicial decision that addresses an argument that is
apparently raised with some frequency in arbitration proceedings: that
individuals who enter the securities industry waive their rights to bring
defamation clauns against broker-dealer employers by executing the Form
U-4 The Form U-4 contains language that authorizes broker-dealers to
submit Form U-5 information and releases the broker-dealer from at least




58. The Form U-4 includes a provision whereby the registered representative auth-
orizes:
[AIll my employers and any other person to furnish to any jurisdiction or
organization or any agent acting on its behalf, any information they have,
including my creditworthiness, character, ability, business activities, educational
background, general reputation, history of my employment and, m the case of
former employers, complete reasons for my termination. Moreover, I release
each employer, former employer and each other person from any and all liability,
of whatever nature, by reason of furnishing any of the above information,
including that information reported m the [Form U-5].
Before November 1991, the Form U-4 did not contain the language in the second sentence
quoted above, which releases employers and former employers from liability with respect to
information included in Forms U-5. The pre-1991 version of the form contained less specific
1316
FORM U-5 DEFAMATION 1317
language, broker-dealers frequently defend defamation claims m arbitration
on the ground that the Form U-4 waiver language confers an absolute
privilege on defamatory Form U-5 statements. However, arbitration
decisions indicate that while the waiver argument is regularly raised, arbitra-
tion panels routinely reject it, albeit implicitly I
The Baravati court directly addressed the waiver argument and summar-
fly dismissed it as frivolous. 60 Further, the Baravati court went so far as to
suggest that if it were the practice of arbitrators to refuse to recognize an
absolute privilege for Form U-5 defamation, broker-dealers' consent to have
Form U-5 defamation claims adjudicated m arbitration could constitute a
waiver of any absolute privilege that might otherwise exist.61
waiver language regarding statements by former employers.
Filings connected with the SEC's approval of the 1991 version of the Form U-4
indicated that the revision to the waiver language was made in recognition of 1989 changes
to the NASD's rules, under which Forms U-5 were for the first time required to be provided'
to terminated individuals and their prospective employers. See generally Notice of Proposed
Rule Change by NASD, Inc. Relating to Amendment to Form U-4 and to Form U-5,
Exchange Act Release No. 27,683, 1990 WL 309911 (Feb. 7, 1990) (explaining purpose of
proposed change). Nothing in the rule filings that accompanied the 1991 changes to the Form
U-4 indicated an intent to innunize broker-dealers from all defamation liability The absence
of any discussion of privilege issues in the 1991 rule filings and the SEC's adopting release
suggests no intent that the revised Form U-4 language prospectively immunize providers of
Form U-5 information from all defamation liability.
59. See, e.g., Zackoffv Masterson Moreland Sauer Whisman Inc., NASD Arbitration
No. 92-913 (Nov 9, 1993). Given the extremely deferential standard of review that courts
must apply when reviewing arbitration awards, see supra note 42, an arbitration panel's
failure explicitly to address this waiver argument does not constitute a basis for setting the
panel's award aside.
60. Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994). The
same waiver argument was raised in Fahnestock & Co. v Waltman, 935 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.
1991), discussed mifra notes 62-74 and accompanying text, and in Glennon v Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., No. 3-93-0847, 1994 WL 757709 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 15, 1994), discussed
infra notes 75-87 and accompanying text, but was not addressed m the courts' decisions. See
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, Cross-Appellee Fahnestock & Co. at 11 n.*, Fahnestock & Co.
v Waltman, 935 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 90-7867, 90-7869); Brief of the Securities
Industry Association, Inc. as Armcus Cunae in Support of Petitioner-Appellant/Cross-
Appellee at 13-15, Fahnestock & Co. v Waltman, 935 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 90-
7867, 90-7869); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.'s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion
to Vacate Arbitration Award in Whole or in Part at 29 n.12, Glennon v Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., No. 3-93-0847, 1994 WL 757709 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 15, 1994); Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc.'s Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Vacate Arbitration
Award in Whole or in Part and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Cross-Motion to Confirm Award
at 16-17, Glennon v Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., No. 3-93-0847, 1994 WL 757709 (M.D.
Tenn. Dec. 15, 1994) [all briefs on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review].
61. Baravati, 28 F.3d at 708. The court noted that the record did not reflect whether
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b. Statements Made Pursuant to Legal Duty
Two federal courts - one a court of appeals and the other a district
court - have ruled that Form U-5 information is protected by a qualified
privilege as statements made pursuant to a legal duty The first of these is
Fahnestock & Co. v Waltman,62 whose facts are remarkably similar to those
of Baravati. Fahnestock & Co. terminated Joseph Waltman because the firm
was closing the division that Waltman headed. The firm filed an initial Form
U-5 that attributed Waltman's departure to "business consolidation." Later,
when a dispute arose over the ownership of certain files, Fahnestock amended
Waltman's Form U-5 to indicate that he had been fired for cause and had
stolen property from the firm. Fahnestock also brought an arbitration pro-
ceeding against Waltman seeking return of the disputed files and damages.
Waltman filed a counterclaim m which he alleged that the firm and several of
its officials had defamed him by filing the amended Form U-5.6'
The NYSE arbitration panel heard testimony concerning threats by the
chairman of Fahnestock's board to have Waltman arrested for failing to return
the disputed files, as well as testimony regarding the chairman's instructions
to file an amended Form U-5 to indicate that Waltman had been terminated
for cause and had stolen firm property The arbitrators also heard testimony
that, in an effort to pressure Waltman into abandoning is defamation
counterclaim, threats had been made to is subsequent employer.' The
arbitrators awarded Waltman $100,000 in actual damages and $100,000 in
punitive damages on his defamation claim. 65
Waltman sought to have the award confirmed. Fahnestock sought to
have the award vacated on the ground that the arbitrators had exceeded their
authority in granting an award for defamation and in awarding punitive
damages.66 The district court demed the firm's petition to vacate the award
it was the practice of arbitrators to refuse to recognize the existence of an absolute privilege.
Id. A review of publicly available arbitration awards suggests that this may be the case.
Indeed, only one award even acknowledged that the waiver argument had been raised, and it did
not explicitly address the argument. See Zackoff v Masterson Moreland Sauer Whisman, Inc.,
NASD Arbitration No. 92-913 (Nov. 9, 1993).
62. 935 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1120 (1992). As noted infra
note 75, however, Glennon v Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. has been appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. It is expected that the case will be argued in late
1995.
63. Id. at 514.
64. Id.
65. Id. The arbitrators also awarded Waltman $56,000 in compensatory damages for
wrongful discharge and $14,700 in legal fees. Id.
66. Id. at 515.
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of compensatory damages, and rejected the firm's claim that statements made
m the amended Form U-5 were absolutely privileged. 67 Instead, the district
court found only a qualified privilege, which could be overcome upon a show-
mg of malice or lack of probable cause for statements made m Forms U-5.
68
On cross appeals, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit affirmed the award of compensatory damages for defamation. On
the issue of immunity for statements made m Forms U-5, the court stressed
that its standard of review was whether the arbitrators had manifestly dis-
regarded the law m awarding the employee compensatory damages for defam-
ation.69
The court noted the qualified privilege accorded under New York com-
mon law to statements made pursuant to a legal duty 7o This privilege pro-
tects statements fairly made by a person m the discharge of some public
or private duty, legal or moral, or m the conduct of his own affairs, m a
matter where his interest is concerned. 71 The court stressed, however, that
such qualified privileges may be lost upon a showing that a commuication
was made with actual malice, which the court described as "personal spite
or ill-will, or culpable recklessness or negligence." 72 Noting that there was
ample record evidence of the firm's "flagrantly spiteful conduct, demonstrat-
mg its intent simply to injure Waltman's reputation," the court concluded
that, although the firm was protected by a qualified privilege in filing the
amended Form U-5, the arbitrators acted within their authority m determm-
ing that the qualified privilege did not protect the filing of the amended Form
U-5.1 As to Fahnestock's arguments that Form U-5 reporting was absolutely
privileged, the court noted without elaboration that the arbitrators had
apparently declined to extend the absolute privilege accorded to statements
made in connection with judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings to Form U-5
statements. 74
The second federal decision that has analyzed Form U-5 information m
terms of the qualified privilege that protects statements made pursuant to a
67 The district court, however, vacated the arbitrators' award of punitive damages,
holding that arbitrators cannot award punitive damages. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 516.
70. Id.
71. Id. (collecting New York cases on common-law privilege for statements made
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legal duty is Glennon v Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,75 which was decided by
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee in
1994. The case involved John Glennon, an employee of Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. Glennon's termination was precipitated in part by a dispute
over money- The firm had paid Glennon approximately $22,500 in excess
expense allotments, which Glennon retained as an offset against approxi-
mately $42,500 that he claimed the firm owed to him for recruitment and
finder activities.76 Following Glennon's termination, Dean Witter filed a
Form U-5 which stated that, when terminated, Glennon had been under
investigation for fraud and wrongful taking of property 7 The Form U-5
further stated that Glennon had been terminated "as a result of his refusal to
repay monies he was paid inadvertently over a period of several months,
monies to which he had no entitlement. "78
Glennon brought an arbitration claim against Dean Witter in wuch,
among other things, he sought damages for defamation.79 Following a
hearing, an NASD arbitration panel required Dean Witter to correct Glen-
non's Form U-5,a° awarded Glennon $728,250 in compensatory damages
75. No. 3-93-0847, 1994 WL 757709 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 15, 1994), appeal docketed,
No. 95-5257 (6th Cir. 1995).
76. Although Glennon was entitled to an annual expense allotment of $2,500, Dean Wit-
ter mistakenly paid him that sum monthly He retained the excess payments as a setoff against
the $42,500 that he claimed the firm owed him. See Glennon v Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
NASD Arbitration No. 91-2594 at 3,4 (Oct. 7, 1993) [hereinafter Glennon Award].
77 Glennon v Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., No. 3-93-0847, 1994 WL 757709 (M.D.
Tenn. Dec. 15, 1994) at *1. In fact, no such investigation was ongoing at the time, although
there was an ongoing dispute as to Glennon's entitlement to certain compensation. Id.
78. Id.
79. Glennon had been the manager of Dean Witter's branch office in Nashville, Tennes-
see. His arbitration claim initially charged that the firm demoted him from his salaried mana-
gerial position to an unsalaried sales position after he reported to firm officials (or refused
to condone) serious misconduct by branch office personnel. Glennon sought damages for
retaliatory discharge, plus payment of approximately $42,500 in finder's fees and recruitment
bonuses. See generally Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Support of Cross-Motion to Con-
firm and in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Vacate at 4-5, Glennon v Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., No. 3-93-0847, 1994 WL 757709 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 15, 1994) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Glennon Award, supra note 76, at 2-4. Subsequently,
Glennon amended his claim to include a defamation charge based on the explanation of his
discharge contained in the Form U-5. See generally Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Sup-
port of Cross Motion to Confirm and in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Vacate, at 4,
Glennon v Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., No. 3-93-0847, 1994 WL 757709 (W.D. Tenn. Dec.
15, 1994) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Glennon Award, supra note
76, at 4.
80. Glennon Award, supra note 76, at 7 The award directed that Glennon's Form U-5
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and $750,000 in punitive damages on Ins defamation claim, and required the
firm to pay Glennon attorney fees of $213,000.81
Glennon brought an action to confirm the award, and Dean Witter
sought to have it set aside. In challenging the award, Dean Witter main-
tamed, among other things, that defamatory statements made on Forms U-5
were absolutely protected under the judicial or quasi-judicial privilege - the
same common-law privilege addressed in Baravati." The firm maintained
that the same policies that caused the common law to accord an absolute
privilege to statements made in connection with official or quasi-judicial
proceedings - including the need to encourage cooperation and candor by
parties called upon to provide information in connection with such proceed-
ings - dictated that comparable protection should be accorded to defamatory
information reported on Forms U-5.S3 Alternatively, the firm argued that the
Form U-5 statements should enjoy the qualified privilege that Tennessee his-
torically accorded to statements made in good faith pursuant to a legal duty I
The district court sustained the arbitrators' award in all respects. As to
Glennon's defamation claim, the court noted that Tennessee accords a quali-
fied privilege to commumcations made in good faith upon any subject matter
in which the communicating party has an interest or in reference to which he
has a legal duty to a person having a corresponding interest or duty I The
court further noted that, although Dean Witter clearly had a duty to complete
be amended to reflect that his termination had resulted from a dispute over compensation.
Id. at6.
81. The arbitrators also required Dean Witter to pay Glennon the approximately
$42,500 in finders fees and a recruitment bonus that he claimed the broker-dealer owed hun
and directed Glennon to refund the overpayments he had received from the firm. However,
the arbitrators rejected Glennon's claim that he had been discharged m retaliation for his
"whistle-blowing" activities. Id. at 6-7
82. See generally Dean Witter Reynolds' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion
to Vacate Arbitration Award m Whole or m Part and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Cross-
Motion to Confirm Award at 25-30, Glennon v Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., No. 3-93-0847,
1994 WL757709 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 15, 1994); Dean Witter Reynolds' Reply Memorandum
of Law m Support of Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award m Whole or Part at 12, Glennon
v Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., No. 3-93-0847, 1994 WL 757709 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 15,
1994) [briefs on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review].
83. Dean Witter Reynolds' Memorandum of Law m Support of Motion to Vacate
Arbitration Award in Whole or m Part at 28-30, Glennon v Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., No.
3-93-0847, 1994 WL 757709 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 15, 1994) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
84. Id. at 30-31.
85. Glennon v Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., No. 3-93-0847, 1994 WL 757709 (M.D.
Tenn. Dec. 15, 1994), at *7
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the Form U-5, it was unclear that the firm had completed the Form U-5 m
good faith. Specifically, the court cited the record evidence regarding a
history of ill will that had existed between Glennon and his superiors at Dean
Witter.86 Given this pattern of ill will, the court concluded that the arbi-
trators properly could have found that, under Tennessee law, the filing of
Glennon's Form U-5 was not protected by any privilege.'
Curiously, the Glennon court reached this conclusion without any
explicit discussion of Dean Witter's alternative argument: that Forms U-5
enjoy an absolute privilege. This ormssion is significant because, although
bad faith will overcome qualified privileges, good faith and motive are
completely irrelevant m the context of absolute privileges. Thus, if Forms
U-5 are protected by an absolute privilege under Tennessee law, a history
of ill will by Glennon's superiors would not cause the firm to forfeit this
privilege.
2. The Absolute Pnvilege Cases: Herzfeld & Stern v Beck and
Culver v Merrill Lynch & Co.
To date, two courts have held that Form U-5 information enjoys the
same absolute privilege that protects statements made in connection with
quasi-judicial proceedings. The holding in each case rested on constructions
of New York law, although neither case devoted any discussion to Fahne-
stock, in which the Second Circuit also applied New York law but reached
the opposite conclusion.
The first of these cases is Herzfeld & Stem, Inc. v Beck,"8 which was
decided by New York's intermediate appellate court. The case is unusual in
that it is one of only two Form U-5 defamation cases that did not arise in the
context of an action to confirm or set aside an arbitration award.89 It is also
the only state court decision in the area.
86. Id. The court noted that the record included evidence that one of Glennon's
supervisors had threatened Glennon, frightened him, and physically prevented him from
leaving his office. Id.
87 Id.
88. 572 N.Y.S.2d 683 (N.Y App. Div 1991), appeal dismissed, 590 N.E.2d 251
(N.Y 1992).
89 After the case had been pending in court several years, Herzfeld sought to compel
Beck to arbitrate his defamation claim. The court declined to compel arbitration on the
ground that Herzfeld's degree of involvement m judicial proceedings was such that belatedly
requing the matter to be arbitrated would prejudice Beck. See Settle Order of Judge Walter




After Warren Beck left the employ of Herzfeld & Stem, the broker-
dealer fied a Form U-5 that indicated that Beck had terminated hIs employ-
ment voluntarily ' Subsequently, the firm amended the Form U-5 to reflect
that it terminated Beck's employment as a result of unauthorized trading and
noncompliance with the NYSE know-your-customer rule. 91 Upon receiving
the amended form, the NYSE launched an investigation. In response to an
NYSE inquiry, the firm wrote two defamatory letters to the exchange
regarding Beck's conduct, and Beck sued for damages.'
The firm sought to dismiss the complaint based upon an absolute mi-
munity for statements provided in Forms U-5, but the trial court denied the
motion to dismiss. The Herzfeld court reversed the trial court's decision and
disrmssed the complaint on the ground that brokerage firms are required by
law to provide information through the Form U-5 to the NYSE, a quasi-
judicial body acting in its judicial capacity while investigating the matter.
The court noted that the Form U-5, which the firm was compelled by law to
file, had precipitated the exchange's investigation and that the two letters
were sent to the exchange m connection with the mvestigation. 93 The court
held that, under New York law, the absolute privilege for statements made
in connection with quasi-judicial proceedings attached not only to the hearing
stage, but to every step of the proceeding, including preliminary and investi-
gatory stages, and regardless of whether formal charges were ever made.
The court therefore held that both the amended Form U-5 and the two letters
were prepared in connection with a quasi-judicial proceeding and were
absolutely privileged under New York law 4
Significantly, Herzfeld focused on the role that the Form U-5 played m
causing the NYSE to initiate an investigation. The court reasoned that once
an investigation had been launched the absolute privilege that attached to
quasi-judicial proceedings applied not only to information supplied in
connection with the exchange's investigation, but also to the Form U-5 that
prompted the investigation. The decision leaves unclear the status of defam-
atory Form U-5 information that does not lead to an SRO investigation;
90. Herzfeld & Stem, Inc. v Beck, 572 N.Y.S.2d 683, 684 (N.Y App. Div 1991),
appeal dismissed, 590 N.E.2d 251 (N.Y 1992).
91. Id.
92. Id. The letters apparently discussed the charges contained m the amended Form
U-5, but the Her4feld court's decision does not describe their contents.
93. Id. at 685.
94. Id. The Herfeld court did not cite to Fahnestock & Co. v Waltman, discussed
supra notes 62-74 and accompanying text, which was decided two months earlier and which
also applied New York law.
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however, the court's analysis - under which the privileged status of the
Form U-5 information derived from the resulting investigation - suggests
that such information may not enjoy absolute immuity
Recently, in Culver v Merrill Lynch & Co. , the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York followed Herzfeld and con-
cluded that defamatory statements made in Forms U-5 enjoy absolute im-
munity under New York law The case arose from Merrill Lynch's termina-
tion of James Culver. Following his termination, Culver filed a civil action
in which he alleged, among other things, Form U-5 defamation, fraud,
breach of contract, and violations of various whistle-blowing statutes, 96 and
sought $74 million m damages.' The Form U-5 that was filed following
Culver's termination reported that he was terminated after Merrill Lynch
learned that "he took no corrective action upon becoming aware that a trans-
action had been entered by a subordinate which was violative of Firm policy
and was not forthcoming when initially questioned about the transaction. "98
Culver, however, alleged that he was terminated m retaliation for reporting
misconduct by the firm to appropriate authorities.'
Merrill Lynch moved to dismiss Culver's Form U-5 defamation claim
on the ground that information reported in the form was absolutely privi-
leged.1°° The court agreed, relying upon Herzfeld. The court reasoned that,
as was the case in Herfeld, the information that Merrill Lynch reported on
the Form U-5 regarding Culver had been made "in the course of a quasi-
judicial proceeding, and was 'material and pertinent' to the reasons for
Culver's termination."101 The court therefore held that, regardless of
whether Merrill Lynch had acted with malice, the Form U-5 information
about Culver was absolutely privileged. Thus, Culver's Form U-5 defama-
tion claim was dismissed. 1
Culver neither discussed nor attempted to distinguish decisions that have
found the quasi-judicial proceedings privilege inapplicable to Form U-5
95. [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 98,811, at 92,885 (S.D.N.Y
July 17, 1995).
96. Id.
97 Lynnette Khalfani, Judge's Ruling May Protect Wall Street From Defamation Suits
by Ex-Brokers, WALL ST. J., July 24, 1995, at A7A.
98. Culver v Merrill Lynch & Co., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCII) 98,881, at 92,886 (S.D.N.Y July 17, 1995).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 92,888.




statements. 03 Because these decisions include Fahnestock, a decision of the
Second Circuit construing New York law, the extent to which Culver may
influence other courts remains to be seen. Nonetheless, Culver is an im-
portant decision because it is the first time that any federal court has found
that defamatory Form U-5 information is absolutely privileged.
In addition to their common result, Herzfeld and Culver share the
distinction of being the sole reported cases m which Form U-5 disputes were
initially litigated m court rather than in an arbitration forum.'°4 Conse-
quently, it is tempting to attribute the conflict that exists between Baravati,
Fahnestock, and Glennon on one hand; and Herzfeld and Culver on the
other, to the deference that courts are required to apply when reviewing arbi-
tration awards. 5 Because neither Herzfeld nor Culver attempted to dis-
tinguish contrary authorities on that (or any other) basis, however, the
validity of such an explanation is uncertain. At present, all that can be said
with certainty is that, based on an extremely small number of cases, it
appears that claims of absolute privilege may fare better in courts applying
New York law than in SRO arbitration forums.
IV Policies Favonng a Qualified Privilege
Whether broker-dealers should be granted an absolute as opposed to a
qualified privilege for defamatory U-5 statements is a policy issue. Absolute
privilege is conferred where society's interest in the free flow of a particular
type of information is so strong that communicators are granted complete
immunity from defamation liability "0 Intent, good faith, and motive are
irrelevant when an absolute privilege has been granted." 7 Qualified privi-
leges, by contrast, are conferred when society's interest m encouraging the
103. The Culver decision was issued on July 17, 1995, well after the four other decisions
discussed in the text. As previously noted, supra note 94, the Herzfeld court did not cite to
Fahnestock, which the Second Circuit had decided two months earlier.
104. As previously noted, supra note 27, most disputes over the content of Forms U-5
are required to be arbitrated. Consequently, the majority of Form U-5 disputes that have
reached the courts have done so in the context of actions to enforce or to set aside arbitration
awards.
105. As previously noted, supra note 42, courts reviewing arbitral decisions are required
to apply the highly deferential "manifest disregard" standard. Thus, court decisions issued
in this context are not necessarily indicative of what the same courts would do if confronted
with the same issues in the first instance.
106. See generally PAUL ALEXANDER & VANESSA WELLS, EMPLOYEE, BuSINESS &
PROFESSIONAL DEFAMATION § 7.04[1][a] (1992).
107 See, e.g., id.
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flow of certain types of information is strong, but not sufficiently compelling
to warrant protecting persons who defame out of ughly improper motives
or in a particularly egregious way Unlike absolute privileges, qualified
ones may be lost if abused.lOS
The courts that have addressed the Form U-5 imunity issue have
reached differing conclusions on the relative importance to society of Form
U-5 information. Based on the common-law privilege accorded to quasi-
judicial proceedings, the Herzfeld and Culver courts apparently believed that
society's interest in SRO disciplinary proceedings was sufficiently substantial
to warrant recognition of an absolute privilege in at least some circum-
stances. On the other hand, the Baravati court reached the opposite con-
clusion on the applicability of this same common-law privilege to Form U-5
information. The Fahnestock and Glennon courts, by contrast, analyzed the
provision of defamatory information on a Form U-5 under common-law
qualified privileges recognized for information supplied pursuant to a legal
or moral duty The parties in Baravati conceded that the qualified privilege
for employee references applied to Forms U-5. As with any qualified
privilege, these privileges can be forfeited if the speaker acts with malice or
through excessive publication.
Within the securities industry there is a widespread belief that state-
ments made in Forms U-5 should be absolutely privileged because the grant
of only a qualified privilege would have little effect on the volume of
arbitration claims relating to Forms U-5. Some members of the industry
maintain that a qualified privilege would be insufficient to allay their
litigation-risk concerns and would not increase broker-dealer willingness to
provide candid and complete information on the Form U-5. These members
assert that only an absolute privilege would be sufficient to protect them.l19
This argument appears to assume that broker-dealers face no litigation
risk if they provide only "bare bones" information or file a "clean" Form
U-5 when such an action is unwarranted by the facts. Twiss v Kury,11° a
108. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 593, 599-605A (1977); DAVID
A. ELDER, DEFAMATION: A LAWYER'S GUIDE § 2.3[], at 127-46 (1993); LAWRENCE H.
ELDRIDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 93, at 508-23 (1978); ALEXANDER & WELLS, supra
note 106, § 7.04.[l][b], at 7-56, 7-57; Harold A. Jones, Interest and Duty in Relation to
Qualified Privilege, 22 MICH. L. REV 437 (1924); John E. Hallen, Character of Belief
Necessary for the Conditional Privilege in Defamation, 25 ILL. L. REV 865 (1931).
109. See, e.g., Brief of the Securities Industry Association as Amicus Curiae at 3, Fahne-
stock & Co. v Waltman, 935 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 90-7867, 90-7869).
110. 25 F.3d 1551 (1lth Cir. 1994); see also Palmer v Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,
622 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). The Palmer case was "based on identical facts
[as in Twiss] (the only difference being the identity of the plaintiffs)." Palmer, 622 So. 2d
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1994 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
however, demonstrates that this assumption is invalid. Twiss involved David
Kury, a registered representative who had been employed by E.F Hutton
until the firm discovered that he had engaged in misconduct and required
him to resign. Following his termination, the firm filed a Form U-5 that did
not reflect E.F Hutton's awareness of Kury's misconduct. During the four
years following his termination by E.F Hutton, Kury remained in the
securities industry until state officials ultimately revoked Ins securities
license as a result of his involvement in a pyramid scheme."' Investors who
became Kury's clients in the years after is departure from E.F Hutton
brought an action against Kury, E.F Hutton, and others. The investors
alleged, among other things, that E.F Hutton had acted negligently with
respect to Kury's current and future customers by misrepresenting the
reasons for Kury's termination on the Form U-5.
The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred in part by grant-
ing the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the investors' negli-
gence claim. The court upheld the district court's determination that E.F
Hutton owed no common-law duty to Kury's subsequent investors."' How-
ever, the court held that, under a state statute that made false reporting to
state securities regulators unlawful, the investors' negligence action against
E.F Hutton should be allowed to go forward since E.F Hutton was legally
obligated to file Kury's Form U-5 with state securities officials. "1 Accord-
ingly, the court remanded the investors' negligence action to the district
court. "'4 Thus, Twiss indicates that in some instances persons who entrust
their investments to a problem representative following the filing of a
"clean" Form U-5 can maintain negligence actions against the broker-dealer
who failed to disclose the former employee's wrongdoing on the Form U-5.
Apart from such potential civil liability to injured investors, broker-
dealers who fail to report misconduct accurately and completely on Forms
U-5 may be subject to disciplinary actions by SROs.1"5 Consequently, the
at 1088.
111. Twiss v Kury, 25 F.3d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994).
112. Id. at 1555.
113. Id. at 1555-56.
114. Id.
115. The NASD has stressed to NASD member firms their obligation to provide accurate
and complete information on Forms U-5, and the NASD has warned that the failure to fulfill
this obligation may lead to disciplinary action. See NASD NoTICE TO MEMBERS 88-67
(NASD, Inc. Washington, D.C.), Sept. 1988, at 73-74. To date, at least one arbitration
panel has referred a case that involved a claim of Form U-5 defamation to the NASD for
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option of censoring Form U-5 information in the hope of avoiding defama-
tion litigation is not without litigation risks of its own.
Without mmmnuzmg the difficulties confronting broker-dealers, how-
ever, the debate over Form U-5 reporting often overlooks the fact that truth
has long constituted a complete defense to defamation claims. 11 6 Therefore,
truthful reporting of derogatory information on the Form U-5 should not
give rise to defamation liability concerns. The real issue is the extent to
which broker-dealers should be liable for reporting derogatory information
that is untrue.
Regulators generally have supported according broker-dealers a quali-
fied privilege for Form U-5 reporting that is defamatory and untrue. For
example, the Chairman of the SEC has expressed support for adopting an
SEC rule that would grant such mumity,117 SEC staff have advocated
adopting a qualified privilege through statute or through SEC rule," 8 and the
NASD has expressed support for a federal statute that would protect Form
U-5 reporting unless it was made either with knowledge that the information
was false or in a grossly negligent or reckless manner." 9 A statutory or rule
provision granting such a qualified privilege may be proposed within the
next year.
possible disciplinary action. See Glennon v Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., NASD Disciplinary
Referral No. 91-2594 (Oct. 5, 1993) (disciplinary referral to NASD concerning Dean Witter's
actions regarding Glennon's Form U-5). The NASD's Code of Arbitration Procedure
authorizes such disciplinary referrals when the record of an arbitration proceedings suggests
that a violation of NASD rules or the federal securities laws has occurred. NASD Code of
Arbitration Procedure, § 5, NASD Manual (CCH) 3705, at 3712 (1995). Other types of
inadequate Form U-5 reporting have already formed the basis for SRO disciplinary action.
See In re Edward D. Jones & Co., NYSE Hearing Panel Decision No. 94-166 (Dec. 19,
1994) (untimely filing); In re Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., No. 85-19, 1985 WL 152219
(NYSE Hearing Panel Feb. 27, 1985) (same). See also Michael Siconolfi, Regulators Press
Firms to Identify Problem Brokers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 1995, at A3 (reviewing recent
SRO disciplinary actions involving Form U-5 deficiencies).
116. See generally ELDER, supra note 108, § 2.2[B]; ELDRIDGE, supra note 108, §§ 63-
71, at 323-38; KEETON sr. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 116, at 839-
42 (5th ed. 1984).
117 See SEC Considering Qualified Immunity Rule Against Tort Suits By Former
Employees, 26 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep (BNA) No. 40, at 1372, 1372 (Oct. 14, 1994); SEC Will
Probe Smaller-Sized Firms, Levitt Tells House Rogue Broker Hearing, 26 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1231, 1232 (Sept. 16, 1994).
118. LARGE FIRM REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
119. See Letter from Joseph R. Hardiman, President, National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc., to Honorable Edward J. Markey, Chairman, House Subcommittee on Tele-




Whether such a qualified privilege proposal will be perceived as
affording broker-dealers sufficient protection remains to be seen, however.
Although some broker-dealers have supported recognition of a qualified
privilege as a means of encouraging greater candor in Form U-5 reporting,
others believe that a limited privilege will do little to deter the filing of
arbitration clamis alleging Form U-5 defamation. These members of the
industry maintain that they will gain little if they are granted only a qualified
privilege because they will continue to be named in arbitration claims and
forced to incur the costs of defending nonmeritorious actions. Further, some
broker-dealers maintain that the best means of encouraging accurate and
complete reporting on the Form U-5 is not private damage actions for
defamation, but SRO disciplinary actions against firms that fail to provide
such reporting.
Clearly, increased SRO disciplinary actions against firms that fail to
provide candid and complete Form U-5 reporting would underscore the
importance of the form as a regulatory tool and deter incomplete or abusive
reporting. However, it is less clear that damage awards for Form U-5
defamation do not also serve a deterrent function, particularly if awards are
limited to cases m which inaccurate information is reported on the Form U-5
in bad faith, recklessly, or with knowledge of falsity Thus, it is not self-
evident why the SROs' ability to initiate disciplinary actions against firms
that fail to fulfill their Form U-5 reporting obligations renders unnecessary
private damage actions by persons who suffer reputational injury This is
particularly so given that large damage awards for Form U-5 defamation
have been infrequent and rarely granted in frivolous or marginal cases.
Indeed, the facts of such cases as Baravati and Fahnestock naturally raise
questions about whether the grant of an absolute privilege would strike a fair
balance between broker-dealers' litigation-risk concerns and registered repre-
sentatives' reputational interests.
Further, to the extent that broker-dealers maintain that policy consider-
ations dictate that they be given an absolute privilege for defamatory state-
ments made in Forms U-5, they argue for a level of protection that even the
SROs do not enjoy Significantly, the two statutory provisions that address
the SROs' potential liability for defamation in the reporting context grant
only a qualified imumty The first of these is Exchange Act Section
15A(i), which directed the NASD to establish a toll-free telephone service
through which callers may obtain information on the disciplinary histories
of securities firms and their registered personnel. Section 15A(i) provides
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that the NASD "shall not have any liability to any person for any actions
taken or omitted m good faith under this paragraph."'20
Similarly, under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970,121
SROs are required to notify the Securities Investor Protection Corporation
when they become aware of facts that lead them to believe that any broker-
dealer subject to their regulation is approaching financial difficulty, and the
SROs must undertake certain oversight responsibilities with respect to such
broker-dealers. " Once again, SRO immunity for actions taken pursuant to
this statutory obligation is limited to those "taken or omitted in good
faith. "2i
Thus, Congress has not immunized SROs from all liability for defama-
tory statements contained in reports required by law Only in the context of
fulfilling their quasi-judicial functions .are SRO officials and personnel
accorded full immunity from tort liability 124 It is difficult to discern why a
broker-dealer's completion of a Form U-5 - a step far removed from any
SRO quasi-judicial function - is deserving of absolute protection from tort
liability
V Conclusion
As the Seventh Circuit noted in Baravati, an absolute privilege is
"strong medicine," and a compelling case has not been made for extending
the privilege beyond the judicial and quasi-judicial context into the area of
Form U-5 reporting," especially given the abuses that have sometimes
occurred with respect to such reporting. Given the possibility of such abuses
and the very serious damage that improper Form U-5 reporting can do to
individuals' business reputations and employment prospects, immunizing
broker-dealers from all liability for defamatory Form U-5 statements would
afford insufficient protection to the reputational interest of individuals
employed in the securities industry Any response to Form U-5 defamation
concerns must balance these reputational interests, securities regulators' need
for accurate and complete information about the movements of problem
120. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(i) (Supp. V 1993).
121. Id. §§78aaa-11I(1988).
122. Id. § 78eee(a)(1) & (2) (1988).
123. Id. § 78iii(b) (1988).
124. See Austin Municipal Sec., Inc. v NASD, 757 F.2d 676, 697 (5th Cir. 1985)
(holding that absolute immunity applies to actions taken within outer scope of disciplinary
duties, but that no immunity applies for actions taken outside of that authority).
125. Baravati v Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir. 1994).
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representatives, and broker-dealers' desire for protection against civil liabil-
ity for good-faith errors in Form U-5 reporting. To achieve such a balance,
Form U-5 statements should enjoy only qualified protection from defamation
liability

